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# BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S IRAQ CLAIMS AT ODDS WITH PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE, POST-WAR EVIDENCE

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UPDATED NOVEMBER 17, 2005

*In the months leading up to the war in Iraq, the Bush Administration repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed a wide array of weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and chemical weapons, and that Saddam Hussein's regime had active programs designed to produce more weapons, most notably nuclear weapons. Several intelligence analyses and assessments have indicated that, before the war, there was considerable doubt about the factual basis of the Bush Administration's claims, and the Iraq Survey Group, the team of U.S. military and civilian experts charged with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction, never found any evidence to substantiate those claims. This document compares each of the Bush Administration's major claims to both the intelligence available before the war began and the post-war findings of the Iraq Survey Group and others.*

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# SCORECARD : MAJOR CLAIMS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S CASE FOR WAR

Claim	Used Discredited Source?	Ignored Dissent from Intelligence Community?	Relied on a Single Source?
<i>Nuclear Program</i>			
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.		✓ Ignored dissent from State Department's INR.	
Iraq sought to purchase uranium from Niger.	✓ Documents allegedly proving the deal were proved forgeries.	✓ Ignored report produced by Ambassador Joseph Wilson at CIA's behest.	✓ Relied on forged documents provided to the U.S. embassy in Italy.
Iraq sought high-grade aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment.		✓ Ignored dissent from State Department's INR and Energy Department's nuclear laboratories.	
<i>Terrorism</i>			
Iraq had connections with al Qaeda.		✓ FBI and CIA officials called terrorism links into question.	
Iraq provided chemical and biological weapons training and assistance to al Qaeda.	✓ DIA and CIA both questioned source's credibility.	✓ Ignored widely disseminated warnings from the DIA that the source was unreliable.	✓ Ibn al-Shayk al-Libi was the single source.
Abu Musab al Zarqawi served as a link between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.		✓ Anonymous American intelligence sources publicly criticized the link.	
9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officials in Prague in 2001.	✓ Source was deemed unreliable by the FBI and CIA.		✓ Czech government reported intelligence was from a single Arab student.
<i>Biological Program</i>			
Iraq had built mobile biological weapons labs.	✓ Relied on two sources labeled as "fabricators," "Curveball" and an INC source.	✓ Ignored warnings from CIA and DIA that sources were fabricators.	✓ Silverman-Robb Commission notes that "virtually all" the intelligence about the labs came from "Curveball," with other sources confirming it.
Iraq could launch a biological or chemical attack within 45 minutes of receiving orders.		✓ Failed to vet claim with the intelligence community before including it in a speech.	✓ Relied solely on a British government dossier.
<i>Chemical Program</i>			
Iraq possessed up to 500 tons of chemical weapons.		✓ Ignored warnings in September 2002 DIA report.	
<i>Delivery Systems</i>			
Iraq was developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to deliver chemical or biological weapons.		✓ Ignored dissent from the U.S. Air Force Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.	

# 1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CLAIM: IRAQ HAS RECONSTITUTED ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND WILL SOON ACQUIRE WEAPONS.

## ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program...Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.” (Speech, 10/7/02)

**Bush:** “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” (Speech, 10/7/02)

**Cheney:** “We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons...Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.” (Remarks, 8/26/02)

**Cheney:** “We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.” (*Meet the Press*, 3/16/03)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.” (U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, 10/02)

“There was no solid evidence that indicated Iraq’s top nuclear scientists were rejuvenating Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.” (Greg Thielmann, former INR official, Associated Press, 7/19/03)

“There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites...After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.” (Dr. Mohamed El Baradai, Director General of IAEA, Report to U.N., 3/7/03)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

“Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War. ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, key findings, 10/6/04)

“Months of searching by hundreds of U.S. experts have found no trace of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in Iraq, just as U.N. inspectors found none before the war. No Iraqi scientists have confirmed the programs were revived in recent years.” (Associated Press, 12/1/03)

“The nuke program was not resurgent. It is clear that the Iraqis had realized how seriously decayed their capability in the area had gone...It would be an exaggeration to say this was a resurgent program on the verge of producing its first nuclear weapon or nuclear materials.” (David Kay, former director of the Iraq Survey Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace forum, 2/5/04)

# 2 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CLAIM: IRAQ IS SEEKING TO PROCURE URANIUM FROM AFRICA IN ORDER TO PRODUCE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FOR USE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

## ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” (State of the Union Address, 1/28/03)

**Cheney:** “[W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” (*Meet the Press*, 9/8/02)

**Powell:** “Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component: sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb.” (Address to the United Nations, 2/5/03)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“The claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are highly dubious.” (INR, U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, 10/02)

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents — which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger — are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.” (Dr. Mohamed El Baradai, Report to U.N., 3/7/03)

“The CIA sent two memos to the White House in October voicing strong doubts about a claim President Bush made three months later in the State of the Union address that Iraq was trying to buy nuclear materials in Africa, White House officials said Tuesday...In fact, the officials acknowledged Tuesday, the CIA warned the White House early on that the charge, based on an allegation that Iraq sought 500 tons of uranium in Niger, relied on weak evidence, was not particularly significant and assumed Iraq was pursuing an acquisition that was arguably not possible and of questionable value because Iraq had its own supplies. Tuesday’s disclosures indicate top White House officials knew that the CIA seriously disputed the claim that Saddam Hussein was seeking uranium in Africa long before the claim was included in Bush’s January address to the nation.” (*Washington Post*, 7/23/03)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

“ISG has not found evidence to show that Iraq sought uranium from abroad after 1991 or renewed indigenous production of such material — activities that we believe would have constituted an Iraqi effort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, 10/6/04)

“These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President.” (Statement of CIA Director George Tenet, 7/11/03)

“Knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq’s attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech.” (senior Bush Administration official, *Washington Post*, 7/8/03)

# 3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CLAIM: IRAQ HAS BEEN ACQUIRING HIGH-QUALITY ALUMINUM TUBES TO ENRICH URANIUM FOR USE IN A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

## ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.” (Remarks to U.N. General Assembly, 9/12/02)

**Rice:** “We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance — into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to — high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.” (CNN *Late Edition*, 9/8/02)

**Powell:** “Most U.S. experts think [the aluminum tubes] are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.” (New York Times, 2/6/03)

**Powell:** “He is so determined that [he] has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed.” (UN Address, 2/5/03)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“Iraq’s efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets.” (INR, U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, 10/02)

“The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq’s attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminum tubes...Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq’s efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revised centrifuge program.” (Dr. Mohamed El Baradai, Report to U.N., 3/7/03)

“In the case of the aluminum tubes, there was a genuine controversy, and yet that genuine controversy was not honestly described when you had senior administration officials talking about it. Condoleezza Rice said the aluminum tubes could only really be used for centrifuges. No one party to the debates would have ever made a statement like that. There were doubts that increased over time and there were doubts by serious people who had serious knowledge of the issue.” (Thielmann, 7/9/03)

“The government’s centrifuge scientists — the Energy Department’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and its sister institutions — unanimously regarded this possibility as implausible.” (Washington Post, 8/10/03)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

“ISG has found that high-level Iraqi interest in aluminum tubes appears to have come from efforts to produce 81-mm rockets, rather than a nuclear end use.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, 10/6/04)

“It is my judgment, based on the evidence that was collected, but there clearly can be more, that it’s more than probable that those tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a centrifuge program.” (David Kay, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 1/28/04)

# 4

## IRAQ AND TERRORISM

CLAIM: IRAQ HAS SINISTER AND WELL-DEVELOPED TIES TO AL QAEDA.

### ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided Al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training...We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior Al Qaeda terrorist planner.” (Radio Address, 2/8/03)

**Rice:** “There is no question in my mind about the al Qaeda connection. And what emerges is a picture of a Saddam Hussein who became impressed with what al Qaeda did after it bombed our embassies in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, began to give them assistance in chemical and biological weapons, something that they were having trouble achieving on their own, that harbored a terrorist network under this man Zarqawi, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein was told that Zarqawi was there.” (CNN *Larry King Live*, 2/5/03)

**Rumsfeld:** “We do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior-level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical- and biological-agent training. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal non-aggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of — weapons of mass destruction capabilities.” (Defense Department news briefing, 9/26/02)

### PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“Saddam’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control.” (Defense Intelligence Agency report DITSUM #044-02)

“At the Federal Bureau of Investigation, some investigators say they were baffled by the Bush administration’s insistence on a solid link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden’s network. ‘We’ve been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don’t think it’s there,’ a government official said.” (New York Times, 2/2/03)

“Two of the highest-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda in American custody have told the C.I.A. in separate interrogations that the terrorist organization did not work jointly with the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, according to several intelligence officials. Abu Zubaydah, a Qaeda planner and recruiter until his capture in March 2002, told his questioners last year that the idea of working with Mr. Hussein’s government had been discussed among Qaeda leaders, but that Osama bin Laden had rejected such proposals, according to an official who has read the Central Intelligence Agency’s classified report on the interrogation.” (New York Times, 6/9/03)

### POST-WAR FINDINGS

“Two former Bush administration intelligence officials say the evidence linking Saddam to the group responsible for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks was never more than sketchy at best. ‘There was no significant pattern of cooperation between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist operation,’ former State Department officials Greg Thielmann said this week. ‘Intelligence agencies agreed on the ‘lack of a meaningful connection to al-Qaida’ and said so to the White House and Congress,’ said Thielmann...And U.S. officials say American forces searching in Iraq have found no significant evidence tying Saddam’s regime with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network.” (Associated Press Online, 7/13/03)

“Nearly a year after U.S. and British troops invaded Iraq, no evidence has turned up to verify allegations of Hussein’s links with al Qaeda, and several key parts of the administration’s case have either proved false or seem increasingly doubtful. Senior U.S. officials now say there never was any evidence that Hussein’s secular police state and Osama bin Laden’s Islamic terrorism network were in league. At most, there were occasional meetings. Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community never concluded that those meetings produced an operational relationship.” (Knight-Ridder, 3/3/04)

# 5

## IRAQ AND TERRORISM

CLAIM: TERRORIST LEADER ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI HAD CONNECTIONS WITH BOTH AL QAEDA AND SADDAM HUSSEIN.

### ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.” (Speech, 10/7/02)

**Powell:** “Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida lieutenants... Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this agent offered Al Qaida safe haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaida from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted this safe haven. They remain their today.” (Address to the United Nations, 2/5/03)

### PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“Senior U.S. officials acknowledged to *Newsweek* within days of Powell’s speech that it was ‘unknown’ whether Saddam’s government helped arrange Zarqawi’s hospital stay in Baghdad or whether Iraqi intelligence had any contacts with him while he was in Baghdad.” (*Newsweek*, 6/25/03)

It is the attempt by both the White House and the Pentagon to make a clear and definite link between al-Zarqawi, Ansar al-Islam and Saddam Hussein that has infuriated many within the United States intelligence community... ‘The intelligence is practically non-existent,’ one exasperated American intelligence source said... ‘It is impossible to support the bald conclusions being made by the White House and the Pentagon given the poor quantity and quality of the intelligence available. There is uproar within the intelligence community on all of these points, but the Bush White House has quashed dissent.’ (*Daily Telegraph*, 2/4/03)

“Secret German records ‘compiled during interrogations with a captured Zarqawi associate’ suggest that the shadowy Zarqawi headed his own terrorist group, called Al Tawhid, with its own goals and may even have been a jealous rival of Al Qaeda. The captured associate, Shadi Abdallah, who is now on trial in Germany, told his interrogators last year that Zarqawi’s Al Tawid organization was one of several Islamist groups that acted ‘in opposition’ to bin Laden’s Al Qaeda... The transcripts indicate that while there was certainly interaction between members of Zarqawi’s Jordanian-focused terror group and Al Qaeda, the organizations largely operated separately and had different aims... Several U.S. officials familiar with intelligence reports that were used to craft Powell’s Feb. 5 presentation to the Security Council told *Newsweek* they were aware all along of the German information about Zarqawi.” (*Newsweek*, 6/25/03)

“The president said some al Qaeda leaders had fled Afghanistan to Iraq and referred to one ‘very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year.’ It was a reference to Abu Mussab Zarqawi, a Jordanian. U.S. intelligence already had concluded that Zarqawi was not an al Qaeda member but the leader of an unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al Qaeda adherents, the sources said.” (*Washington Post*, 6/22/03)

### POST-WAR FINDINGS

“A secret draft CIA report raises new questions about a principal argument used by the Bush administration to justify the war in Iraq: the claim that Saddam Hussein was ‘harboring’ notorious terror leader Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi prior to the American invasion... An updated CIA re-examination of the issue recently concluded that Saddam’s regime may not have given Zarqawi ‘safe haven’ after all... No evidence has been found showing senior Iraqi officials were even aware of his presence, according to two counterterrorism analysts familiar with the classified CIA study who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter.” (*MSNBC*, 10/26/05)

“A CIA report has found no conclusive evidence that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein harbored Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which the Bush administration asserted before the invasion of Iraq. “There’s no conclusive evidence the Saddam Hussein regime had harbored Zarqawi,’ a U.S. official said on Tuesday about the CIA findings.” (*Reuters*, 10/6/04)

“Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has described him as a Qaeda operative, but a senior American military official said recently that sources now indicated that Mr. Zarqawi was ‘a separate jihadist.’” (*New York Times*, 7/13/04)

# 6

## IRAQ AND TERRORISM

CLAIM: IRAQ MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE TERRORIST  
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

### ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Cheney:** “Well, I want to be very careful about how I say this. I’m not here today to make a specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11. I can’t say that. On the other hand, since we did that interview, new information has come to light. And we spent time looking at that relationship between Iraq, on the one hand, and the al-Qaeda organization on the other. And there has been reporting that suggests that there have been a number of contacts over the years. We’ve seen in connection with the hijackers, of course, Mohamed Atta, who was the lead hijacker, did apparently travel to Prague on a number of occasions. And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center.” (*Meet the Press*, 9/8/02)

**Cheney:** “It’s been pretty well confirmed that he [Mohamed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack.” (*Meet the Press*, 12/9/01)

### POST-WAR FINDINGS

“We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.” (9-11 Commission, Staff Statement No. 15)

“No, we’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th.” (President Bush, 9/17/03)

“Czech intelligence officials said they had a report from a single source that Atta met in April of 2001 in Prague. Subsequent media reports in the United States revealed the source was actually an Arab student who was not considered particularly reliable, the F.B.I. investigated, found nothing to substantiate the report of the meeting, in fact the F.B.I. concluded Atta was most likely in Florida at the time of the supposed meeting and C.I.A. questioned existence of this meeting.” (*Democracy Now*, 9/16/03)

“The ties with al Qaeda was just the scare tactic to exploit the trauma, the very real trauma, that the American people have felt ever since 9/11.” (Ray McGovern, former CIA analyst, “Uncover the Whole Truth About the Iraq War,” 10/03)

### ADMINISTRATION PERSISTS WITH DISCREDITED CLAIMS

**Cheney:** “Now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.” (*Meet the Press*, 9/14/03)

**Cheney:** “On the question of — of whether or not there was any kind of relationship, there clearly was a relationship. It’s been testified to; the evidence is overwhelming. It goes back to the early ’90s. It involves whole series of contacts — high-level contacts between Osama bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence officials. It involves a senior official; a brigadier general in the Iraqi intelligence service going to the Sudan before Sudan—before bin Laden ever went to Afghanistan, to train them in bomb-making, helping teach them how to forge documents.” (*CNBC*, 6/17/04)

# 7 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CLAIM: IRAQ HAS BUILT SEVERAL MOBILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LABORATORIES.

## ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents — equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery.” (Weekly Radio Address, 2/8/03)

**Rice:** “What we need is immediate Iraqi compliance, immediate Iraqi cooperation...We need to know what has become of the mobile biological weapons laboratories that now repeated people have told us exist in Iraq.” (*Meet the Press*, 2/16/04)

**Powell:** “One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents...The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.” (UN Address, 2/5/03)

**Powell:** “We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few — perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more.” (UN Address, 2/5/03)

**Rumsfeld:** “They have mobile biological capabilities.” (House Armed Services Committee hearing, 9/18/02)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“Inspectors did not find evidence to support intelligence reports regarding the existence of mobile production units for biological weapons.” (“WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12/03)

“The charge that Iraq had mobile biological-warfare research laboratories came solely from a defector provided to U.S. intelligence officials by Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi, said senior U.S. officials, revealing the oversight for the first time yesterday...The Defense Intelligence Agency, which debriefed the defector, flagged the information he provided as questionable in 2002.” (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 2/6/04)

“The Bush administration helped rally public and congressional support for a preemptive invasion of Iraq by publicizing the claims of an Iraqi defector months after he showed deception in a lie-detector test and had been rejected as unreliable by U.S. intelligence agencies...The White House used Saeed’s [Adnan Ihsan Saeed al Haideri] claims in a background paper nine months after CIA and DIA officers had dismissed him as unreliable.” (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5/18/04)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

“In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons...ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the [mobile laboratory] program.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, 10/6/04)

“I think the consensus opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while they had capabilities in many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological weapons.” (David Kay, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 1/28/04)

“They are not mobile germ warfare laboratories. You could not use them for making biological weapons. They do not even look like them. They are exactly what the Iraqis said they were — facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.” (British Intelligence Officer, quoted in *The Observer*, 6/15/03)

“We looked at the sourcing in the case of the mobile trucks and trains. There was multiple sourcing for that...But it turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and, in some cases, deliberately misleading. And for that, I am disappointed and I regret it.” (Secretary Powell, *Meet the Press*, 5/16/04)

# 8

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS

**CLAIM: IRAQ POSSESSES SARIN NERVE GAS, MUSTARD GAS, VX NERVE AGENT, AND OTHER CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO KILL THOUSANDS.**

### ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS

**Bush:** “Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.” (State of the Union Address, 1/28/03)

**Powell:** “Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.” (UN Address, 2/5/03)

**Rumsfeld:** “His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulism toxin and possibly smallpox. His regime has amassed large stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas.” (House Armed Services Committee hearing, 9/18/02)

### PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

“A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM actions... There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.” (September 2002 DIA report)

“Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980’s.” (Igor Mitrokhin, “Concealment Aspect — Chemical Weapons,” UNSCOM internal working paper, 1/20/98)

“Any sarin they were making in 1990, 1991, had a known shelf life of about two months. Well, if you made it 12 years ago and it had a shelf life of two months, it may not be safe to drink but it isn’t sarin nerve gas any longer. And there’s no way the agency could not have known that.” (Peter Zimmerman, former technical adviser to the U.S. delegation to START negotiations, “Uncover the Whole Truth About the Iraq War,” 10/03)

### POST-WAR FINDINGS

“ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, 10/6/04)

“I’m personally convinced that there were not large stockpiles of newly produced weapons of mass destruction. We don’t find the people, the documents or the physical plants that you would expect to find if the production was going on. I think they gradually reduced the stockpiles throughout the 1990’s. Somewhere in them mid-1990’s, the large chemical overhang of existing stockpiles was eliminated.” (David Kay, *New York Times*, 1/24/04)

# 9 ADMINISTRATION'S USE OF DISCREDITED SOURCES

SOURCE: IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS AND AHMED CHALABI

## ADMINISTRATION USE OF SOURCES

"A memo written by a top Washington lobbyist for the controversial Iraqi National Congress... suggests that the INC last year was directly feeding intelligence reports about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and purported ties to terrorism to one of Cheney's top foreign-policy aides. Cheney staffers later pushed INC info — including defectors' claims about WMD and terror ties — to bolster the case that Saddam's government posed a direct threat to America." (*Newsweek*, 12/15/03)

"The Special Plans Office [in the Pentagon] developed a close working relationship with the I.N.C., and this strengthened its position in disputes with the C.I.A. and gave the Pentagon's pro-war leadership added leverage in its constant disputes with the State Department. Special Plans also became a conduit for intelligence reports from the I.N.C. to officials in the White House." (*New Yorker*, 5/12/03)

The INC-provided source on mobile biological weapons labs "was one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units." (Senate Intelligence Committee report, 7/7/04)

**Bush:** "From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them." (State of the Union Address, 1/27/03)

**Powell:** "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails...Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings." (Address to the United Nations, 2/5/03)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

"In April 2002, the CIA published an assessment of the INC source [on mobile biological weapons labs] that stated that DHS had terminated contact with him after four meetings because of suspicions he was a fabricator. In May 2002, DIA issued a 'fabrication notice' which said that the information the INC source provided was 'assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication.'" (Senate Intelligence Committee report, 7/7/04)

"Most of the defectors' testimonies were discounted in the run-up to the war by analysts at the CIA and State Department, which soured on the Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi, in the 1990s...Senior U.S. officials said that despite doubts about the defectors' reports, they continued to be sought by top civilians in the Defense Department and other officials eager to make the case for war." (*Knight Ridder*, 2/17/04)

"Dubious intelligence about Iraq's biological weapons programs found its way into the Bush Administration's case for a preemptive invasion of Iraq despite the fact that officials warned in May 2002 that some of the information might be unreliable or fabricated. The charge that Iraq had mobile biological warfare research laboratories came solely from a defector provided to U.S. intelligence officials by Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi, said senior U.S. officials." (*Knight Ridder*, 2/6/04)

"The Administration also publicized claims about Iraqi mobile biological-weapons labs from a defector whom the Defense Intelligence Agency had labeled a fabricator...The White House used [Adnan Ihsan Saeed al Haideri's] claims in a background paper nine months after CIA and DIA officers had dismissed him as unreliable." (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5/18/04)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

"Intelligence officials have concluded that almost all the Iraqi defectors whose information helped the administration's case for war exaggerated what they knew or were 'coached' on what to say...Most of the former Iraqi officials were made available to U.S. intelligence agencies by the Iraqi National Congress." (*Knight Ridder*, 2/17/04)

"There have been other situations where we believe that information was either fabricated or embellished. And just — it's a situation that we have in other human operations, where the information spans a pretty broad range of veracity." (DIA Director Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 3/9/04)

**Ahmed Chalabi:** "As far as we're concerned we've been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. What was said before is not important." (*Daily Telegraph*, 2/18/04)

# 10 ADMINISTRATION'S USE OF DISCREDITED SOURCES

SOURCE: "CURVEBALL"

## ADMINISTRATION USE OF SOURCE

"The Bush administration's prewar claims that Saddam Hussein had built a fleet of trucks and railroad cars to produce anthrax and other deadly germs were based chiefly on information from a now-discredited Iraqi defector code-named 'Curveball,' according to current and former intelligence officials... Based largely on his account, President Bush and his aides repeatedly warned of the shadowy germ trucks, dubbed 'Winnebagos of Death' or 'Hell on Wheels' in news accounts, and they became a crucial part of the White House case for war — including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's dramatic presentation to the U.N. Security Council just weeks before the war." (*Los Angeles Times*, 3/28/04)

**Bush:** "From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them." (State of the Union Address, 1/27/03)

**Powell:** "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails...Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings." (Address to the United Nations, 2/5/03)

## PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

"The individual, code-named 'Curve Ball,' was debriefed by a foreign intelligence service and the only American to meet Curve Ball thought he was an alcoholic. Others in the Pentagon raised concerns about Curve Ball's credibility, but his information still became the centerpiece of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's presentation to the United Nations seven weeks before the war." (*Washington Post*, 7/10/04)

Former CIA European Division Chief Tyler Drumheller "said the CIA had 'lots of documentation' to show suspicions about Curveball were disseminated widely within the agency. He said they included warnings to McLaughlin's office and to the Weapons Intelligence Non Proliferation and Arms Control Center, known as WINPAC, the group responsible for many of the flawed prewar assessments on Iraq. 'Believe me, there are literally inches and inches of documentation' including 'dozens and dozens of e-mails and memos and things like that detailing meetings' where officials sharply questioned Curveball's credibility, Drumheller said." (*Los Angeles Times*, 4/2/05)

"German officials said that they had warned American colleagues well before the Iraq war that Curveball's information was not credible — but the warning was ignored...German agents told *Die Zeit* newspaper that they had warned the Bush administration long before last year that there were "problems" with Curveball's account. 'We gave a clear credibility assessment. On our side at least, there were no tricks before Colin Powell's presentation,' one source told the newspaper." (*Guardian*, 4/2/04)

## POST-WAR FINDINGS

"Virtually all of the Intelligence Community's information on Iraq's alleged mobile biological weapons facilities was supplied by a source, codenamed 'Curveball,' who was a fabricator. (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction [Silverman-Robb Commission] report, 3/31/05)

"Curveball was subsequently determined to be a fabricator who had been fired from the Iraqi facility years before the alleged accident, according to the commission and Senate reports." (*Washington Post*, 5/22/05)

"It has now emerged that Curveball is the brother of a top aide of Ahmad Chalabi." (*Guardian*, 4/2/05)

# 11

## ADMINISTRATION'S USE OF DISCREDITED SOURCES

SOURCE: IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI

### ADMINISTRATION USE OF SOURCE

"Without mentioning him by name, President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, and other administration officials repeatedly cited Mr. Libi's information as 'credible' evidence that Iraq was training Al Qaeda members in the use of explosives and illicit weapons." (*New York Times*, 11/6/05)

**Bush:** "We've learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases." (Speech, 10/7/02)

**Powell:** "I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida...He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Muhammad Atif, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help...They went to Iraq. The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000." (Address to the United Nations, 2/5/03)

### PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE

"It is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers." (Defense Intelligence Agency report DITSUM #044-02)

"As an official intelligence report, labeled DITSUM No. 044-02, the document would have circulated widely within the government, and it would have been available to the C.I.A., the White House, the Pentagon, and other agencies." (*New York Times*, 11/6/05)

"At the time of Mr. Powell's speech, an unclassified statement by the C.I.A. described the reporting, now known to have been from Mr. Libi, as 'credible.' But Mr. Levin said he had learned that a classified C.I.A. assessment at the time stated 'the source was not in a position to know if any training had taken place.'" (*New York Times*, 11/6/05)

[The Defense Intelligence Agency report DITSUM #044-02 can be viewed at Senator Levin's website:  
<http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=248339>]

### POST-WAR FINDINGS

"In January 2004 al-Libi recanted his claims, and in February 2004 the CIA withdrew all intelligence reports based on his information. By then, the United States and its coalition partners had invaded Iraq." (*Washington Post*, 11/6/05)