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RE: COMBATting WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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BODY:

MR. FINEL: Good afternoon. My name is Bernard Finel. I'm the executive director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. On behalf of my coeditors, Brian Finlay and Janne Nolan, I'd like to welcome you all to the launch of our book, "Ultimate Security: Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction". I just want to take a couple of moments to say a few introductory remarks, and I'll turn it over to Janne Nolan, who will be moderating our discussion. And we'll be able to hear from four of our authors in the chapter in the book.

Our goal of this book was very much to look at strategies of non- proliferation: what's worked in the past, what's likely to work in the future. But as we worked on this project in the late 1990s -- we started off working in part in the mid-1990s -- we began to realize that it was hard to extrapolate from the past the future, in part because so many changes in the non-proliferation environment -- changes in the nature of the threat internationally, and just as importantly, changes in the way the U.S. government is organized for non-proliferation, the vast explosion of agencies and departments interested in the issue -- made it very challenging to look at. So I think a lot of all of our findings are suggestive.

They try to give some ideas about the future, but also try to take into account the vast areas of transformation.

But very much our goal was to try to find ways to apply lessons of the past to the future, trying to be optimistic about what successes are out there. And in that light, let me just say one quick word about Iraq.

We all tend to be pessimistic in the nonproliferation community, in part because whenever there is any proliferation, it's seen as a failure. Clearly some of us in the field -- Joe Cirincione, for example, has been much more optimistic in making a strong case for a nonproliferation treaty regime, for example. But for the most part, we tend to be pessimistic. And I think we're seeing some of that pessimism today as we talk about Iraq. We talk about Iraq very much as an intelligence failure. But a flip side of Iraq as intelligence failure is Iraq as a nonproliferation success.

When we think about it, it turns out that the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration, through coercion, through inspections, through sanctions, through constant pressure on Iraq, seem to more or less have been able to disarm a very difficult regime. So I will just leave that cheery note to ponder as we go through our discussions. And I'm sure all these issues will be covered in much more depth by our speakers.

On that note, let me turn things over to Dr. Janne Nolan, who will be moderating the rest of our discussion.

Dr. Nolan is on the faculty of the Security Studies program at Georgetown University and has been for many years, teaching courses on nonproliferation, U.S. nuclear policy and ethics in international security.

She has served in senior positions in the executive branch, in the Senate and she is a prolific author in the field of international security and politics, having finished six books. She is currently working on another volume on dissent and national security.

Janne?

MS. NOLAN: Thank you very much, Bernard.

My job here is to moderate this panel and to welcome all of you and say a few words about the genesis of this book, quickly. I want to particularly congratulate all of the media here for having such an intense interest in this book. (Laughter.) That's very kind of you!

I've written several Brookings books; this book was published by Brookings. And we used to say about Brookings books, once you put them down you could never pick them up -- (laughter) -- but apparently not today.

First, I want to thank very much the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, its president Jessica Mathews and Joe Cirincione and Rose Gottemoeller for making this event possible.

I want to thank the Century Foundation and Georgetown University for being the sponsors of this book and my colleagues who worked to edit and contribute to this book.

I want to thank Brian Finlay, who is not up here, though he should be, for keeping this project alive when it looked like it might not make it.

And to thank the funders who always deserve thanks for sponsoring research that is sometimes very timely. You never can predict. The MacArthur Foundation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation, and particularly Kennette Benedict and George Perkovich.

I will quickly introduce the authors. I want to just say that this project started before September 11th. As Bernard noted, the point of this exercise was to explore the phenomenology of proliferation and the degree to which an increasing emphasis on military instruments was seeming to eclipse the very complex and fruitful instruments that have been used, some of them for a long time, some are more innovative, to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The point of this book is that though it may seem to be easier to exert the use of force, especially unilaterally, it really is only a small part of a very complex mosaic of instruments that are brought to bear and have been brought to bear successfully. Each of these chapters addresses some aspect of that fundamental premise.

We're going to start with David Kay. I asked him for a bio. He responded with one word - "unemployed." (Laughter.) I think you know who he is.

I'm going to go ahead and just introduce the speakers.

Our next speaker will be Joe Cirincione, who I'm sure is known to all of you; is a senior associate here at Carnegie, and he is the director of the Nonproliferation Project. He spent nine years on Capitol Hill, both with the House Armed Services Committee and the Government Operations Committee.

Next we'll turn to Rose, who is also a senior associate here at the Carnegie Endowment, who has served in several senior positions in the executive branch, including the Department of Energy.

And then we'll turn to Rob Litwak, who is the director of the Division of International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

So, without further interruption, let's turn to David.

Thank you.

MR. KAY: Thank you very much, Janne. I'll keep -- I promise you I'll keep to my 10 minutes.

I must say, there's something about Janne and her foresight about arranging this that's

amazing.

Janne called me, I think it was three or four weeks ago, about this date, pulling it together, and I said, sure, I'd be happy to do it. I said nothing about what I was going to do or had no idea of what was going to happen last week.

I must say a number of you, the journalists, at least, keep asking me, in the best of Washington sports, do I think George Tenet should be fired. And I keep giving you my standard answer: I can't even figure out why Donald Trump kept Sam around so long. And I don't like the idea of "ready, fire, and aim." But I will say, Janne, if indeed George Tenet ever decides to stop being DCI, based on your performance with regard to this news conference, I think you should be seriously considered. (Laughs.) You certainly had the foresight to figure out what was the most timely day, probably, in the last month to hold a book party.

Let me just quickly move through -- and I'm going to spare you, believe me, going through the article and the book. A, I haven't gotten the book; B, I wrote the article so long ago -- (laughs) -- I don't remember what I said, but I suspect I don't want you to know, having just said we were all wrong, including myself.

Let me deal with the current issues before us. And let me start by the way I -- and let me underline "I" -- see the current situation in Iraq, why I think it's that way, and some broader issues.

To me it's clear Iraq had no large stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons at the time of the war. I'm struck because I remember February 5th. Those of you don't remember, it's Secretary Powell's speech before the Security Council. It was one of the coldest days in my life, to stand out in front of the U.N. But if anyone had asked Secretary Powell that day, "Nine months, 10 months after the end of the war, do you think you will have found weapons of mass destruction, and would you really say that it might take you another year or two of searching before you'll know whether they existed?" I don't think if that answer had been, "Yeah, a year, nine months after the end of the war, we may still be searching for those large stockpiles," that simply wouldn't have been an acceptable answer.

And I have to say I'm a little troubled when people say, as they do all the time to me, "Baghdad is bigger than L.A., Iraq is the size of California; aren't there some places that the WMD could be hidden?" Well, in one sense the answer is yes, but what's really insulting to me is the belief that we would design a strategy that relied on searching for the actual weapons themselves once you go beyond the place that your intelligence said they should be.

What we did, and I think what anyone would have done in that situation, is say: Look, if there were large stockpiles, they had to be produced by people, they had to be produced in facilities, and they would have left some indelible signs.

Where are those people? Where are those facilities? Where are the documents, the importation and there other records of such large production? Those have not been found.

And I think those are pretty compelling proof at this point, maybe even the famous 85 percent level, for me, of proof that those don't exist.

The nuke program was not resurgent. It is clear that the Iraqis had realized how seriously decayed their capability in this area had gone, and in 2000 they started investing some modest amounts of money in rebuilding facilities, primarily Tuwaitha, ordering -- clandestinely ordering, let me say -- some nuclear equipment. So it was on their mind, but it would be an exaggeration to say this was a resurgence -- resurgent program on the verge of producing its first nuclear weapon or nuclear materials.

There was continued R&D in the chemical and biological area -- R&D that was not reported to the U.N., much R&D that was not discovered during the last U.N. inspection. And there is multiple Iraqis willing to testify that they were asked by the U.N., but they dared not tell the U.N. the truth the way they would tell Iraq Survey Group the truth, because of the security service. No great surprise there.

The missile area was absolutely an aggressive program, and more aggressive than -- I must say, than I think has been portrayed in the press here. And let me tell you where I think the story is and one that, particularly after Libya, people need to pay attention to. And that was the extent of foreign assistance and foreign procurement.

I mean, it's been a wake-up call for me and, I think, most of my colleagues that exist in this area that essentially A.Q. Khan had been running a Sam's Club for nuclear weapons. I mean, the knowledge that some of the centrifuge parts were produced in a special factory in Malaysia and then shipped to Libya is absolutely startling -- this idea that you outsource production. He wasn't stealing or diverting production in Pakistan. He had set up -- someone had set up special arrangements. I'm not sure we're not giving A.Q. more credit than he's due. I'd like to give him a little bit more time in the (gulag ?) than apparently, if I believe this morning's press, he's going to get. I can think of any -- no one who deserves less to be pardoned than A.Q. Khan, unless the pardoning is for complete and full truth about the enterprise.

But in the missile area, what made Iraq so threatening and the program that they really started pushing ahead in late '99, early 2000 was the degree of foreign assistance. And that's one reason the Iraq Survey Group must continue.

We need to unravel this foreign procurement network that is now operating around the world, and that is giving capabilities to at least states, and perhaps to terrorist groups as well to do things that are truly harmful.

I have no doubt in my mind -- I think the proof is there -- that Iraq was in serious violation, material violation of its obligations under 1441. And you know, it was Hans Blix who reported that Iraq had not shown a genuine commitment to disarm. So there's a lot out there that is serious to worry about Iraq, and I'm leaving it aside in the interest of time.

Anyone who has spent time in Iraq and looking at the way the society was torn apart by the depravity of Saddam and his sons and the Ba'athist Party cannot but come away and

say why did we wait so long to rid this country of such a ruler? And I'm not speaking we being the U.S., but the world as a whole. You know, twice within a 15-year period we have to ask ourselves globally why we reacted. Why did we, when the Iraqis used chemical weapons against the Iranians, did we sit around and say nothing about that gross violation of the rules of war? Why did we sit around for as long as we did with ample evidence of Saddam's devastation of Iraqi society? I mean, some people speak of it -- it proves that nonproliferation sanctions can work. Quite frankly, when you're in Iraq and looking at it, you're more torn up by what it shows, at how the world can be satisfied with sanctions and let a ruler tear a country and a people apart, and that is something that deeply troubles me.

Why were we wrong on Iraq? Well, first of all, we should give Iraq some credit. We're still trying to wrestle, all of us I think, wrestle with why did Saddam behave in such a way. Why would Hans Blix come to the conclusion because of Iraqi behavior that they hadn't shown a genuine commitment? Much of the difficulty of understanding proliferation is by the very nature of the regimes that seek to acquire these weapons. So first of all, you ought to give credit to the countries that make it difficult.

Secondly, we missed something that's -- not the first time, but is very, very important -- in fact, it explains much of what is happening on a day-to-day basis in Iraq -- and that's the decay of Iraq's society. The infrastructure came apart.

I remember a senior Iraqi who told me that -- told the Iraq Survey Group that Saddam skimmed \$6.5 billion from the U.N. oil-for-food program, and 60 percent of that went into new palace construction. And the reason for that is -- and this doesn't surprise a Texan -- look, construction contracts are the best vehicles for graft ever discovered by politicians any place in the world! It just -- no money was reinvested in the important social infrastructure.

But, you know, that's not the important issue there. The social glue that holds a society together, that allow people of different religious backgrounds, different ethnic backgrounds, different political beliefs, to cooperate to the degree that makes it necessary for an economy and a society to function, it had been dissolved by Iraq -- by Saddam's behavior.

And that's one reason Jerry Bremer is having such a great difficulty. Of course it's because the U.S. did not adequately plan for the postwar occupation -- no doubt. But the degree of difficulty is not explained by that, it's this dissolution that we all missed. And you know, what's worrying is it's not the first time we and others have missed. We missed the degree that the Soviet Union's capability had decayed until the wall fell. We, and more importantly, the West Germans -- what were then the West Germans, missed how serious the decay in East Germany was before the wall fell. And the German public is still to this day paying for that misunderstanding. We're not very good in the intelligence arena about understanding fundamental societal forces as they start to reverse.

Thirdly -- (aside) -- I really will be through in five minutes. Iraq as I look at it and our understanding of Iraq is what happens when a train starts going in a direction and you say, "That's the way the train is going," and you start picking up pieces of information,

and you're sensitized to those that indicate the train is still going in that direction. And let me try to tell you exactly what I mean by that.

In 1991, Iraq cheated and deceived, or attempted to cheat and deceive -- sometimes they were successful -- UNSCOM. And the nuke area was the first, and it continued, for example, in the biological area up through '95. So that everyone that looked at Iraq said, "They're cheating, they're deceiving, they're lying. They're after retaining their weapons of mass destruction." And as new information was gained, they were -- George Tenet is exactly right -- they continued clandestine procurement right up to before the war.

As you got that information, you added it on to the train that said, cheaters, deceivers, after weapons of mass destruction. Alternative explanations -- they're buying aluminum tubes because the organization that is buying them gets a rake-off from them. And so, the more aluminum tubes, the higher the specifications, the higher the price, the better the rake-off -- the alternative explanations fall away. That is a common problem of analysis, and of those of us who in part in our career who are analysts. You tend to so get locked into a procedure. What we desperately need and we all should be aware of, and I -- you know, I'm as guilty as anyone else on this -- is that when all the evidence starts to look to the same conclusion repeatedly, as George Soros would say, bet the other way and you'll make a lot of money. And that's what didn't happen in this. And there's some really fundamental reasons for that.

I believe our human collection capability decayed in Iraq and in the region to a point of, really, almost non-existence in terms of U.S. recruitment of it. I had at the height of the Iraqi Survey Group under me exactly two case officers who were fluent in Arabic. I had to give those up because of a higher priority. We are as a nation desperately short in the intelligence world of people who are fluent in the language and the cultures of target states, and we need to.

A disease that cropped up after 9/11 but existed long before but has now been enshrined as a goal when it should be recognized as a disease, collect (sic) the dots. Collect (sic) the dots.

Look, what every analyst ought to have carved above their door is "If there are not enough dots to connect, don't go about connecting them." Connecting dots is a dangerous enterprise unless you're also doing collection. When you're not doing collection, dot connection is not what you want your analysts doing.

Let me just deal with one issue, because it's one that's risen to prominence. And that's the issue of was -- did the politicians browbeat the analysts into a view that they did not hold. I can only speak about what I know. I've had over 50 analysts work directly for me. They've had ample opportunity to explain why the world we found was different than the world they wrote about. Not a single one of them ever said "It's because someone twisted my arm and I had to write this; I didn't really believe it." No one's even said their arm was twisted. And I really think the -- and I speak this from -- coming from a background, at least an academic background, of having been an analyst. I think the vice president has gotten unfairly a rap.

Let me tell you, my deepest regret is that prior to 9/11 we did not have vice presidents, secretary of defenses (sic), secretary of states (sic) who would go over to the agency and the other three- letter organizations around this town and ask them about their analysis of al Qaeda and UBL -- Usama bin Laden.

And why they held their -- analysts need to be challenged. A good analyst don't mind needing to be challenged. And the fact of the matter is, we have -- if I look at Secretary of Defense Perry in the Clinton administration, Secretary Albright, Secretary Powell in this administration, Don Rumsfeld -- these are people who have tremendous experience around the world, have met leaders. They are the people who ought to be asking analysts why they came to their conclusion.

Look, you journalists spend immense amounts of time trying to get on my voice mail and other peoples' voice mail to ask questions. The asking questions is part of the truth process. And let me give Janne credit. The best part of writing this book was the getting together with people who had other views on the nonproliferation issue and having them challenge what you've written. That is what you ought to seek out every day. Now, it's not to say and don't misunderstand me -- I believe the independent commission ought to look to see whether there was abuse by political leaders of the data. I think that is an important question that needs to be understood. I can only speak about what I know. I didn't see it. But I certainly believe it ought to be at the top of the agenda as in fact Secretary Powell said to a number of you earlier this week.

Sorry. I stop. (Chuckles.)

MS. NOLAN: Thank you very much. There will be time after the panel for further questions of David Kay.

Joe.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much, Janne.

I want to thank the Century Foundation and Georgetown University for producing this book. And it's a pleasure to cosponsor this event with you.

One just logistical point for the audience: for those of you who have not yet done so, could you either turn your cell phones off or set them to stun? (Laughter.) Thank you. Thank you.

It's a pleasure to be part of the backup chorus for David Kay. And it's somewhat surprising to me to say I agree with about 90 percent of the notes David has just sung. I think he's done us all a considerable service by his frank and candid assessment that he's offered to the nation over the past couple of weeks. And I look forward to working with you, David, on these issues.

We differed in the run up to the war over the necessity for the war and it's good to find how much agreement there is now about some of the things that went right and some of the things that went wrong in our intelligence operation and in the U.N. inspection

process.

Let me just make a quick comment on George Tenet's speech today. I was watching the speech very carefully, and the director mounted a vigorous defense of his prewar intelligence assessment, and I believe he defended it too much. He would have been better served by admitting some of the obvious and glaring mistakes that were made in that intelligence assessment, and it is a mistake to try and defend every phrase that was in the October National Intelligence Estimate when it is painfully obvious that most of it was completely wrong.

And I was struck by some of the director's bottom lines, which indicated that he now believes that Saddam Hussein had the intention to reconstitute a nuclear program, the intention to produce biological weapons at some point, the intention to produce chemical weapons. That's not what the NIE said in October 2002. It said he had reconstituted a nuclear program; that he had a biological weapons program, larger than the program was in 1991, at which point it had been the largest biological weapons program in the world; that he had produced 100 to 500 tons of chemical weapons, most of that in the past year.

As David Kay has just said, it's not a matter of continuing to search for a hidden stockpile, a swimming pool that could be filled with chemical weapons. They have to be produced someplace. Iraq is a large country, but it has a limited manufacturing capability. We have now been to all the facilities that could have possibly produced this. We have not found any evidence whatsoever of ongoing, large-scale production programs, the kinds that would have been necessary to produce the stockpiles the NIE predicted. I believe that Director Tenet has undermined his credibility with his vigorous defense today, not enhanced it.

But the intelligence failure of the Iraq war is just part of the problem. This is -- there is also a policy failure that was operating here, and this is what we discuss and debate in the book that we're here to launch today, "Ultimate Security."

I believe that when the president was -- when President George Bush came to power, he brought with him and put in key policy positions a number of individuals who had a fundamentally different view of what the proliferation problem was in the world and how to solve it.

And they -- as they say in their National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, made a fundamental break with the policies of the past. What was that break?

For almost 40 or 50 years, liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans have cooperated to build up what we call the international nonproliferation regime. This is this interlocking system of treaties and arrangements that has successfully constrained the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction -- not stopped it completely, but held it to a minimum number of states -- still in the single digits -- when it comes to nuclear weapons.

This was not the situation that John F. Kennedy faced in 1960 when he warned,

famously, that if we didn't do something urgently, we would have 15 to 20 to 25 nations with nuclear weapons by the end of the 1960s. Well, we did do something. Republicans, Democrats, President Nixon, President Johnson, President Reagan, President Bush, all together cooperating to pass treaties to ban these weapons of mass destruction.

For 40 or 45 years, the focus has been on the weapons themselves. The idea was that these weapons, as long as they existed, would be used, So the only way to ultimately get the security from the use of these weapons, prevent these weapons from being used, was to get rid of these weapons.

That was Richard Nixon's intention when in 1969 he unilaterally disassembled the U.S. biological weapons program, negotiated the Biological Weapons Convention banning these evil weapons. No one should have them.

This was President George Bush's intention in 1991 when he started the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention and banned, successfully, the production, the use of chemical weapons. No one should have these.

Both those treaties now have 150, 160 member nations signed-on to them. We're down to a handful of nations that are still clinging to some semblance of these programs. And a handful -- less than 10 countries are suspected of having chemical or biological weapons programs.

The same was true for the Nonproliferation Treaty. Kennedy started the negotiations; he couldn't finish it. Johnson did. President Nixon signed it into law. Almost every nation in the world has now signed this treaty except for three -- India, Israel and Pakistan. And North Korea has just withdrawn from it. And that treaty says that no one should acquire nuclear weapons, and those countries that have nuclear weapons will work to abandon those programs, to eliminate those nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration came in with a fundamentally different view. They identified the problem not as the weapons, but certain outlaw regimes that had these weapons.

So the problem was outlaw regimes in possession of these weapons.

The solution was to eliminate the outlaw regimes, not eliminate the weapons. And that's what the national security strategy of the United States says, that's what the national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction says: We would identify and pick off these bad guys. In this volume I talk about why I believe that to be wrong, why I believe you can't just look at the problem as a handful of countries who you judge to be not worthy of or not responsible enough to have these weapons and allow other states to possess these weapons.

But let me just give you one short example of what I mean by that. The administration's calculation that they've expressed in several major speeches, and the president himself uses this a lot, is that the problem, the key danger facing the world today, is the nexus of outlaw regimes, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. Now at first glance that seems reasonable. What we have is the most dangerous groups -- terrorists; linking up

with the most dangerous weapons -- chemical, nuclear and biological weapons; and the most dangerous regimes -- these rogue or outlaw regimes, so that must be the greatest danger.

I think they got the equation wrong, Terrorists plus WMD are our greatest danger. I agree with that. That's the number one threat facing the United States today, that some terrorist group will acquire a nuclear weapon and use it against us. But where are they going to get that nuclear weapon? It's not from Iran; they don't have it. It's not from Iraq; they don't have it. The key part of the equation they got wrong is that it's not outlaw regimes, it's any state arsenal. So it's terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, plus existing state arsenals that form the greatest danger.

So we've been misdirecting our efforts for the past several years focusing on these handful of states -- that do present a danger -- while we've been ignoring the greater danger that exists from existing state arsenals. What do I mean? Like Willie Sutton, the famous 1930s bank robber, said when he was asked, "Why do you rob banks, Willie?" "Because that's where the money is."

Where's a terrorist going to get a weapon? Russia. Why? That's where the weapons are. Twenty thousand nuclear weapons in Russia, enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 40,000 more. Much of that fissile material, much of those weapons are in poorly guarded facilities. We should be accelerating our effort to secure and eliminate those weapons before Osama bin Laden finds a way to buy or steal one of them. That's one of the fundamental challenges we've been ignoring.

Where's another possible source that a terrorist group could get nuclear weapons or materials? Pakistan. George Tenet today said that he was well aware of the illicit procurement and selling activity under way in Pakistan. Why haven't we done more to stop that? Did we just stand by and let that happen? We subordinated that threat to our other concerns. We needed Pakistan's support for other issues going back 20, 30 years. This is not just a problem with this administration. For the past 20 or 30 years we've done this. This is a bipartisan problem.

But we have got to do much more to secure all aspects of Pakistan's programs. To my mind, that country is one of the greatest sources of nuclear weapons threat in the world today, not because of the intentions of its current government, but because of what might happen if President Musharraf's motorcade is just a few seconds slower next time.

What might happen if that country is plunged into instability?

What happens to those weapons? What happens to that material? What happens to the scientists who know how to build those weapons? Those are some of the issues that we have to be addressing in the 21st century: looking at this problem in a much broader context.

And one of the lessons that we've learned from the Iraq war is that, lo and behold, the nonproliferation regime, despite all its critics, is actually in most instances working; that it turns out, as David Kay himself has said, that the system of U.N. inspections and

sanctions, coupled with U.S. military strikes, successfully destroyed most of Saddam's weapons programs and production capabilities. We have to learn that lesson, that in this case the U.N. intelligence was better than the U.S. intelligence. The challenge we face ahead -- and I'll close with this -- is to try to marry up the best of the force- based approach that this administration has adopted -- for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative -- with the best of the treaty- based approach -- for example, universal compliance to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We have to forge this new synthesis in the century ahead to come out with a new, more effective nonproliferation strategy that can enjoy the support of both political parties and of all of our political leaders.

Thank you, Janne.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you very much. Excellent.

Rose.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Jan. And thank you also to Brian Finlay and Bernard Finel, the other two pieces of a world class editing team. We really appreciated all your work throughout as well as the support of the Century Foundation and Georgetown University.

I'm actually going to talk for just a few minutes about my chapter in "Ultimate Security". I'm focusing in that chapter on cooperative inducements. I'm putting forward the basic view that all the work that we've done over the past 10 years-plus in the former Soviet Union with Russia and the other states in the region actually has provided us with a realm of new tools and new capabilities to work on very serious nonproliferation problems, the tough cases we've been talking about so far today, not only Iraq: Iran, North Korea, Libya, and others that might arise and will arise, I'm quite sure.

In that, I want to disagree slightly with my close colleague Joe. I don't think we are not doing quite nothing -- no, that's a double negative. That's not right. We are doing something and working with the Russian Federation and the other states in the region. I agree we're not doing enough --

MR. CIRINCIONE: Right.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: -- and we need to do more. But it is an area where we've had, I think, some good experience in the last several years. And I'd like to make three short points about that.

First of all, in thinking about our experience in the former Soviet Union and with the Russian Federation, we have to think carefully about how to apply the tools of threat reduction cooperation. The current cases are not at all alike.

In the case of Russia, we were working with a nuclear weapons state under the Nonproliferation Treaty, and we were able to work frankly and openly with them to constrain and eliminate their nuclear capabilities. Many, many differences arise in working with states that developed their programs clandestinely, outside of the realm of

international law. I think we will have some important legal and policy issues to confront as we now turn threat reduction techniques to trying to work with these countries.

Let's just consider for a moment the example of the brain drain programs. In Russia, we worked quite openly through the international science and technology centers, the initiatives for proliferation prevention, the Nuclear Cities Initiative to engage former Soviet weapons scientists, first to keep them from selling their expertise abroad and second to help them to transition to non-weapons work.

In Iraq, circumstances are much different, and David himself has noted repeatedly that Iraqi scientists might have been taking Saddam's money and giving him nothing in return. Now, on one level, we should be welcoming this, of course. But on another level, should we in some sense be saying that we are supporting corrupt action?

So therefore, we need to develop a different concept for brain drain programs, in my view, in Iraq. They are not only a mechanism for moving scientist out of weapons work and into the civilian arena, but in fact, I believe, they will have to be a mechanism for rehabilitation and engagement of these scientists and engineers in society, and furthermore, then, an important mechanism for the reconstruction of the country -- so very different kinds of approaches, more subtle and difficult, I think, than the case of the former Soviet Union states, and one that may be more difficult to sustain politically.

So these are the types of issues we have to confront in looking at how we transform the tools in the former Soviet Union.

One other point:

I'm often asked these days if I'm advocating the use of threat reduction techniques and tools in other countries, and therefore do I advocate shoving the IAEA and the United Nations aside?

You often hear that these days in Washington. The U.N. and the IAEA are ineffectual and they need to get out of the way so that we can do it. My answer to that argument is an emphatic no. The United States and the IAEA need to be in close partnership, not in some kind of zero-sum standoff, and the example I have before me is that of Kazakhstan.

At the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had over 2,000 nuclear warheads on its territory, but also a great deal of nuclear weapons-usable material. You probably all know about the 581 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that was at Ust-Kamenogorsk. We brought that material out of the country in Project Sapphire in November of 1994 and stored it at Oak Ridge, much as they're doing with the Libyan materials today. But there are also three tons of ivory-grade plutonium stored at the Aktau reactor in about 300 tons of fuel rods, and that material had to be placed under safeguards. We had a situation where the United States went in first, packaged up the fuel rods, and then the IAEA came in close behind and placed the materials under safeguards at that facility. That is exactly the kind of symbiotic relationship and close partnership we need to have developing today across the world as we work with these proliferation tough cases.

Final point. In my chapter, I do discuss inducements and incentives in our cooperative efforts, but I do agree that we must also stress enforcement. In fact, I agree strongly with all the arguments here today and in Carnegie's recent report on Iraq about the need to strengthen enforcement. I would like to stress, however, that the tools and techniques of threat reduction cooperation are not only about inducement and incentives, but also can help to strengthen enforcement.

Let's look, for example, at one of the mainstays of our cooperation on material and warhead protection, control and accounting in the Russian Federation. In working with the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Defense in Russia, we have emphasized the need to improve personnel reliability, and have extended a wide array of both techniques and procedures and technologies to these ministries in order to help them improve the personnel reliability of those working with nuclear warheads and materials in Russia.

Perhaps some of these very same reliability techniques might now be welcome to Pakistan as they consider their own personnel reliability problems.

So when I talk about improving our enforcement, I think that we should think about the ways threat reduction and the lessons we learned in the former Soviet Union can be applied also to strengthening enforcement. It should just be thought about as a basket of inducements or incentives.

Thank you very much for your attention and we'll turn next, I believe, to Bob Litwak.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

MR. LITWAK: Thank you, Rose. Thank you to the editors and to the organizers of this event.

My chapter focuses on perhaps the most contentious issue in nonproliferation policy: Under what conditions should the United States use force against the state either possessing or seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction?

The political context in which this question is now being addressed was fundamentally altered by September 11th. Those unprecedented terrorist attacks did not alter the structure of international relations, but they did usher in a new age of American vulnerability. In response, the Bush administration enunciated a controversial doctrine of preemption in its September 2002 national security strategy. According to that White House document, preemption is a matter of common sense because of the horrific consequences of an attack with WMD. But while the preemptive use of force has been elevated as an option, the conditions under which that option would actually be exercised remain unclear.

The Iraq war set an important and contentious precedent, as the first case of forcible regime change to achieve nonproliferation objectives. Earlier history reveals few cases in which force was used or even contemplated to prevent WMD proliferation, a telling fact

in itself. This past experience can inform our current debate.

My research focused on five such cases: the Kennedy administration's consideration of a preventive military strike on China's emerging nuclear capability; Israel's June, 1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor; U.S. airstrikes on Iraq's WMD capabilities, both during the 1991 Gulf War and again during Operation Desert Fox in December, 1998; the Clinton administration's consideration of airstrikes on North Korea's nuclear infrastructure during the 1993-94 crisis; and finally, the U.S. cruise missile attack on a suspect Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in August, 1998.

This study utilized a comparative approach addressing a common set of questions to each of the cases in order to generate policy relevant conclusions. The questions were clustered under three categories: first, the character of the threat; second, the political-military context under which military action was being considered; and third, the consequences of the use of force.

The analysis of the cases using this character-context-consequences framework yielded several conclusions:

First, preemption is not a general doctrine and should be a rarely invoked option; the cases in which the United States would even consider the use of force involves the small group of proliferators who combine capabilities with hostile intent. Even within that small group, the United States has, when circumstances permit it or necessitate it, pragmatically pursued nonmilitary strategies, such as the 1994 agreed framework with North Korea to attain its nonproliferation objectives.

Second, force is as problematic as its non-military alternatives. Proponents of preemption often cite the Israeli raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility as a paradigm. But the Osirak case, far from being a paradigm, was a rare instance in which all the conditions for success were present; notably, specific and highly accurate intelligence, and the negligible risk of collateral damage and retaliation. More often in history, the utility of force has been affected by major constraints.

In the 1994 North Korean crisis, the Clinton administration confronted the risk that a military strike on North Korea's nuclear infrastructure could trigger a general war on the Korean peninsula. In the 1998 Sudanese episode, uncertain and contentious intelligence led to a major imbroglio. And in Iraq, during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, the United States tellingly refrained from striking suspect bio and chem sites out of concern of spewing toxins into the environment near populated areas.

In short, force is not a silver bullet.

Third, prevention strategies will forestall the need for preemption. The instances in which force has been considered or used for nonproliferation purposes have been preventive rather than preemptive, including the 2003 war in Iraq. In none of the cases was actual WMD use imminent. The National Security Strategy document acknowledges the contributions of non-military instruments, but the Bush administration is, at best, ambivalent about the effectiveness of those non-military instruments in addressing

proliferation in the hard cases.

The fact that until Iraq, no country has ever been coerced into giving up its unconventional weapons, underscores the importance of traditional nonproliferation strategies that have promoted restraint. The overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime last April raised the question how this precedent-setting case would affect U.S. nonproliferation policy. Many in the Bush administration regarded the war as a demonstration conflict, exemplifying the National Security Strategy. That sentiment was captured in one official's assertion that, "Iraq is not just about Iraq, it is of a type." But of a type in what respect? Was the administration signaling that the Iraq precedent is relevant to the resolution of nuclear crises with North Korea and Iran?

President Bush laid down an ambitious marker when he declared that the United States would not tolerate the acquisition of weapons by Iran and North Korea, the other two charter members of the Axis of Evil, now dubbed the Axle of Evil. But how that declaration would be translated into action within an administration that is openly divided between hard liners and pragmatists remains unclear.

A major cleavage dividing the two camps is whether the U.S. objective toward these countries should be regime change or behavior change. Hard liners viewed the war as a stark example that could compel the other axis members to give up their WMD. The message: disarm or face regime change. This attitude was reflected in the comment of one senior official who told the Los Angeles Times just after the fall of Baghdad, when asked what the message of the Iraq war was for Iran, his response was, "Take a number."

In contrast to the hard liners, administration pragmatists characterized the Iraq war not as the new paradigm, but rather, as an extraordinary remedy for a unique case. The pragmatists are concerned that the take-a-number approach rather than compelling Pyongyang and Tehran to roll back their nuclear programs, could create an incentive for them to accelerate nuclear development in order to deter an American attack. To dampen concerns here and abroad on this point, administration officials assert that they do not have a cookie cutter strategy in dealing with these countries. But critics question whether they have the cookie cutter mindset that precludes meaningful negotiation.

The "Take a number" comment may reflect the administration's visceral attitudes toward the rogue regimes in North Korea and Iran, but major constraints preclude a repeat of the Iraq model in addressing the nuclear crises there. These constraints relate both to the use of force and to the American ability to bring about regime change. With North Korea, the same factors that precluded a strategy of regime change and preemption in the 1990s still hold. In Iran, preemptive military action would also face formidable military and intelligence hurdles. Moreover, an American military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would likely generate a profound anti-American political backlash that would set back the prospects for domestic political reform there. With both countries, the Bush administration is facing hard political realities. Forceable regime change on the Iraq model is not feasible. And regime collapse, a vain hope for some, is not imminent.

Administration policy is also affected by the full-blown credibility crisis for U.S. intelligence, given the failure to uncover WMD stockpiles in post-war Iraq. In this

context, the administration has opted to address these proliferation threats through multilateral diplomacy: with North Korea, directly via the six-party talks; and with Iran, indirectly via the International Atomic Energy Agency and EU ministers.

This turn toward a diplomatic approach has required a pragmatic pivot in policy. However reluctantly, the administration is being pushed toward an important shift in nonproliferation policy; that is, a shift from the initial goal of regime change and preemption to the alternative strategy of deterrence and reassurance of regime survival.

In conclusion, how should this shift be translated into action? In the current crisis, North Korea and Iran should be presented with a structured choice and not be pushed into a choice. In these cases, where regime change and the preemptive use of force are not practical options, the alternative is a strategy of deterrence and reassurance. The regime should be presented with a stark choice, a choice between the tangible benefits of behavior change and the penalties for noncompliance.

A central aspect of reassurance is leaving these regimes a political exit by being prepared to provide a security guarantee of non-aggression and non-interference. The Libyan case is an example of this approach. The crux of the deal is an American assurance of regime survival; that is, permitting Qadhafi to rejoin the family of nations if he alters his regime's behavior with respect to terrorism and WMD. In short, with Libya, to the surprise of many, the United States was prepared to take yes for an answer. The question, on which I will close, is whether we would be prepared to do the same in North Korea and Iran.

Thank you for your attention.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you very, very much. Thank you, Rob. And thanks to all of you for excellent presentations.

I think it's clear that there's a heterogeneity of views across this table. And I'd like to just take the privilege of the chair to say one thing about this debate that is focusing now on the intelligence community: that it would be very, very helpful, in the reporting and discussions, not to focus on scapegoats and not to focus on personalities. If there's one message from this book, it is that these issues are systemic issues that relate to the structure and organization and institutions of the United States government and other governments that are largely hereditary institutions that date back to just after World War II. We are adjusting as a country to new realities.

And in that spirit, I'd say that I had a very different impression of George Tenet's speech this morning; that I heard the director of Central Intelligence standing up for the honesty and integrity of his analysts and his people. And the fact that he has done that and that was required is somewhat symptomatic of the degree to which in this town people look out for personalities rather than the deeper issues that underlie the problems.

So with that, I'll open it to questions, if you could please stand and identify yourself. Is there a microphone circulating?

STAFF: Yeah.

MS. NOLAN: Okay.

Q David Eisenberg (sp) with the American Security Information Council. With regard to the intelligence issue, my question is basically this. The current inquiries seem to be predicated primarily on the assumption or to explore the question of whether or not something was inherently wrong in the gathering, analysis, dissemination of the intelligence information.

It seems to me that's the wrong question, because if we take seriously the reports of prior years from government organized agencies into the effectiveness of the intelligence community -- the National Performance Review, IHC 21, et cetera -- they've all documented in excruciating detail what they considered to be, quote, "dysfunctional," unquote, problems of the intelligence community. So should we not assume, especially with such a hard target as proliferation, that we've already answered the question that the intelligence community is inadequate to the task and our intelligence therefore is insufficient to support the current national security strategy of preventive wars?

MS. NOLAN: I assume that was addressed to David Kay. Why don't we take two -- a couple more questions and then David will give a composite answer.

Q Can I put that question in another way? (Chuckles.) Which is I think the question -- kind of asking --

Q (Off mike.)

MS. NOLAN: Could you identify yourself?

Q -- which is, bearing in mind what you're saying, that you think we got it wrong or you got it wrong or the intelligence services got it wrong, who got it wrong? The intelligence services or the politicians or the interaction?

MS. NOLAN: Could you identify yourself, please?

Q I'm John Lyon (sp), BBC.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

And the gentleman here.

Q I'm Said Arikat, from Al-Quds newspaper. Dr. Kay, you know, you mentioned some things that were missed. I think it was also missed -- the fact that Iraqi officials, one after another, and Iraqi scientists, marked day after day, year after year, month after month, saying, "Look, we don't have any," including the Darth Vader of them all, Saddam himself, on CBS "60 Minutes."

Now I remember asking you, sir, right in the run-up to the war -- and you were quite certain that Iraq had the weapons; in fact, probably we know where they are -- now my

question to you and to Joe: Is it really morally adequate, correct, to say now, "Okay, well, we were wrong, and so what," while in fact there are hundreds and thousands of Americans that have died and maimed, tens of thousands of Iraqis are dying, a war is going on?

Do you believe that that is enough to say, "So what? We were wrong." And we go on?

Thank you.

MS. NOLAN: David, if you could answer the three questions, which seem to have a common thread.

MR. KAY: They do? Okay. (Laughter.)

Well first of all, the last question. Look, we were wrong. The important thing when you make a mistake in life, and in intelligence, anything else, is to understand why you were wrong so you don't repeat the error.

I'll recount an Iraqi -- a very senior Iraqi who told me, in response to your issue, the Iraqis have been saying we don't have weapons. He said, you know, in 1991 when they were dealing with me, he said we made a fundamental mistake by lying, and you caught us. And we continued to lie up through '95 on the biological program. And he said, "I kept telling my Iraqi colleagues that if we continued this behavior, no one would ever believe us, even if we started telling the truth."

Now, I think that behavior affected both the Iraqis and their ability to be believed, and it affected us and our ability to believe the Iraqis. That is really -- look, any of you who have kids, we always -- all of us give this lesson to our kids: Don't start lying because I won't know when to believe you and I will assume you're lying. It works in this area. So I think there were some fundamental issues. We need to understand that.

On the issue of did the politicians distort the intelligence, and was the intelligence right, my answer to that -- and I must say here again, is I think it's a case where we have not given sufficient credit to the way the independent commission looks like it's being established. We've got two models. In the case of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Blair is setting up an independent commission solely to look at the WMD, the adequacy of intelligence with regard to Iraq.

Here, as I understand it -- and, you know, Secretary Powell has actually spoken more of this than almost anyone else in the administration -- the commission is going to have a very broad remit. But most importantly for commissions, it is going to look at anything it judges to be important. And Powell said specifically on this issue, it is going to look at whether the politicians, policymakers misused the intelligence that was being provided.

And I'll just say, finally, on that score, we each were struck by different parts of Director Tenet's speech today. I quite -- I associate myself with Janne.

I think there are a lot of brave men and women in the agency, in not just the CIA, but

across the intelligence community, who do not get credit for what they do and is always going -- mostly always going to be done in the shadows, and they'll never get credit for it. It's important to speak up and defend them.

But I actually -- I heard that speech as saying -- you know, we always said that it was intent and it was capability and not weapons, and it was those others who consumed our intelligence who hardened it. Now, if that's true, that genuinely is disturbing and will have to be investigated.

I mean, these are the reasons we need an important commission. It is to take the response, or the question --

Look, we've known the problems for years. About the most productive use of a disaster is to enable you to have the political momentum to make the corrections that you knew you should have made in advance, but you never had the political momentum to do that. This is a common Washington phenomenon: good things often only get done because a bad disaster looms and you can straighten something out. Those of us who are reaching my age hope it's not the Social Security wreck before those of you who are younger have to correct it, but it may be. That's just Washington, unfortunately. I think we've got an opportunity here. I hope it will be done with the independence and the breadth that is necessary to make those corrections that many of us do know need to be made.

MS. NOLAN: Over here. The two of you.

Q Thank you. My name is Javier Gaston (sp) from the newspaper El Dorado in Mexico City. I have one question for Dr. Kay and one question for whoever wants to take this.

Whoever wants to take this one is, does this perceived apparent failure of intelligence will somehow put a freeze or turn off the national security strategy of preventive war? I mean, because that strategy is based primarily on intelligence. So if it were known that the intelligence is bad, how does that affect the national security strategy?

And does -- the question for Dr. Kay is, you were talking earlier about how the Iraqi Survey Group was lacking in resources, was being expended, its mission, the work is more or less not complete. But yesterday Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about biological weapons hidden in holes, like the one that they got Saddam Hussein in, and how many of those holes there could be in Iraq. Is that realistic to actually looking there?

MS. NOLAN: Thank you. Let's take two more questions. Here and back there.

Q Colin Datalle (sp), Foreign Policy Association. First I have got a comment that Pakistan as an ally supplied to all Axis of Evil countries, and still an ally. That's a comment.

The question is, the main question is, that did you, Dr. Kay, did you get an impression during your thorough investigation that Pakistan was also involved, either in proposing or in supplementing the knowledge of Saddam's regime and these weapons of mass destruction?

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

Question back there.

Q Yes. My name is Gerald Kimbel (sp) with the Arms Control Association. I have a question for Joe Cirincione and David Kay.

Dr. Kay, you've said that we were all wrong, or we were almost all wrong. I would have to disagree. As you know, the inspectors were there after November 27th. They did not find evidence of a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. My question for Joe and David is, why didn't the U.S. intelligence community reassess its assessments in light of the evidence that the inspectors might have found?

Isn't that a relevant issue for the commission and for the American people to consider?

MS. NOLAN: Let's -- Rob will respond to the question about preemption and intelligence, and then we will move down.

MR. LITWAK: My chapter deals broadly with the use of force. And as I argued, there's a small subset of cases in which force would even be considered, let alone used. And even within that subset where it's on the table, there are major constraints, of which intelligence is one, that affect whether it will be implemented or not. In fact, when we think of preemption, the association is frequently with the Israeli raid on Osirak; that is, a military strike on a WMD facility, as was contemplated in a few instances.

One of the open questions about the 2003 war -- and the only reporting I saw on it was in April in The New York Times by Tom Shanker -- was that, as in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, targeters may have eschewed targeting suspect bio and chem sites in the context of an actual war out of the same concern over collateral damage to the environment and civilian population. And that issue has yet to be resolved, and will be presumably in the postwar if there's a public survey that's released, as one was after the 1991 war.

But going beyond just the American debate, the issue of intelligence and its run through the discussion this afternoon is a critical determinant of whether the United States would be able to persuade others to come on board. And there, given the ambiguities of intelligence generically, let alone the tortured experience that we have just gone through with Iraq, the ability to achieve what Kofi Annan has called for -- some type of international consensus on preemption -- I feel is really going to be highly difficult to achieve.

And Mitchell Reiss, an expert on proliferation, refers to the proliferation preemption paradox, which is that early preemption is militarily the easiest because the program's not as far along, but it's politically the most difficult because it's harder to get a consensus on it. Later on it may be easier politically to get a consensus that something's happening, but the military constraints may well be profound at that point. So the issue of intelligence is one of the key determinants of preemptive action. It has been, in historical terms, a major

-- has been a -- operated as a constraint.

MR. KAY: Well, let me try to be -- very quickly on the -- is it possible that there are biological weapons in spider holes all over Iraq?

I don't think so. Not large stockpiles. But I would not be surprised, if, for example, in inspecting one of the -- several hundred ammunition supply points, we found Iraq chemical or biological weapons left over from the '90s. Iraq is not the most efficient place. UNMOVIC found warheads that had not been declared. We found warheads from the 1980s that should have been declared that were not. It's possible. But I don't think that's a credible explanation for the lack -- failure to find large stockpiles.

On the Pakistan issue, look, the possibility of a Pakistan-Iraq connection has been looked at from 1991 by U.N. inspectors at the very beginning, along with me. I know of nothing indicating substantial help from Pakistan to Iraq. It's always been one of the mysteries. You would almost expect to find it; there are some political reasons for thinking you might not. So far, still an open question. It's one of the reasons, in fact, the survey group should continue.

On the question of why the intel community did not reassess based on UNMOVIC -- this is probably going to take more time than we have. Let me just quickly give you the reasons.

There was a great deal of -- I won't say hostility, but unease about the way UNMOVIC's methodology for inspection was being carried out. The failure -- and we had actually had Iraqis speak to us about this. The way they conducted interviews with Iraqi scientists, in rooms that were bugged, under conditions that the Iraqis were almost bound to find out what had been conducted, there was a great deal of suspicion that that was not the most efficient way. Some of the on-site inspection was carried out methodologically in ways that caused concern.

Partly it was also because the variability of the reporting. If you go back and look at the reporting of UNMOVIC to the Security Council, it's almost a period of sine curves. The first Blix report is very negative on Iraq behavior. The second Blix report drops almost the opposite, without much understanding of why. And it sort of goes up and down. It is one of those -- Joe and I had a conversation offline beforehand. It's one of those issues that needs to be looked at. It may be conflicting stereotypes that really get in the way of appreciating what others can do. I suspect -- my personal view is that it's a combination of stereotypes and real differences.

A number of you have asked me, and others have asked me in the last six months or so, why don't you have U.N. inspectors with you? You know, it's an issue.

We hired former U.N. inspectors, who are Americans, Brits and Australians, but we also got them weapons-qualified. Only journalists are foolish enough to run around Iraq without guns on their hip. It's a dangerous place. The U.N. in some preliminary discussions said, "Only if you can guarantee the security of our inspectors." I couldn't guarantee the security of myself!

So you know, it's -- those things need to be fleshed out clearly. That is an area that needs further examination. I certainly -- let me say, again, with regard to your suggestion it ought to be high on the commission's list, the most important thing is to allow the commission members to determine what are the priority issues to straighten this out. If they view it as important, I think, absolutely, you're right; it should be viewed -- but I don't think we should be writing in great detail exactly what they have to look at. That strikes me as a sure way to get a whitewash.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me just add some very quick comments to that. One of the lessons we drew from this experience in our Carnegie report is that there's a need for the United Nations to conduct an after-action report, to understand what worked well in the inspection process and what didn't, which sanctions were working, which weren't. And we believe that there now is an urgent need to reconstruct an accurate history of Iraq's programs.

The way I look at this personally is that it's clear now that there were not large ongoing production programs for either chemical, nukes -- certainly not nuclear or biological weapons. These programs were dead. We're now conducting an autopsy.

We're going to -- in that process, we're going to find remnants of past programs, as David expressed. I wouldn't be surprised to find some mustard gas shells, some designs, some -- perhaps anthrax samples, things like that. But these are the vestiges of past programs and perhaps core capabilities that could have been reactivated at some point, but had not been reactivated.

In that process, it's essential that the U.S. link up with the large history and database that the U.N. inspectors have accumulated. And we're not talking about a wholesale reintroduction of U.N. inspectors back to Iraq, but you know, 15 people -- the right people can make a lot of difference to understanding these areas, particularly in the missile programs. And the U.S. has to be able to tap into that history to get a coherent view of what exactly went on.

Very briefly, on the intelligence question, the way we concluded this is there was two-part intelligence failure on Iraq. The pre-2002 intelligence that was coming out of the national intelligence agencies, from all the declassified statements that we've been able to review, looked fairly accurate. They were overestimating the biological and chemical program, but that was understandable, given past histories and presumed intentions. They had a -- seemed to have a pretty accurate picture of the nuclear program -- that is, that there wasn't any -- and that this -- these judgments changed dramatically in October, with the production of the NIE.

We believe that dramatic change is evidence that there was tremendous pressure to conform the analysts' views to the existing policy positions.

But beyond that, the second stage of the intelligence failure was how senior administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat to the American public, going far beyond what the intelligence estimates were at the time on key issues.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you, Joe.

David Kay has to leave at this point, but we have a few more minutes for those of you who are interested in asking questions of the panel.

Over here and over there.

Q Diane Perlman, co-chair of the Committee on Global Violence and Security, for a division of the American Psychological Association.

To some extent the failures in intelligence could be related to a failure to use psychological intelligence and that there is perceptions of the enemy, groupthink, projection, denial, cognitive dissonance theory, things that could explain that; and also, like David Kay said, a failure to understand the forces of the other side and the psychology of the enemy.

There's also a body of literature on exaggeration of the threat and the image of the enemy in the build-up for a war and the resistance of the enemy image to change and the functions of the enemy image. And Robert Litwak, you mentioned about using deterrence theory plus reassurance, and that's very consistent with the literature, (especially ?) Ralph K. White in "Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War," that says that deterrence has to be accompanied by drastic tension reduction; otherwise you could get into spiral theory -- and deterrence theory also has some flaws.

My question, which will be, I guess, to you, Janne, and to you, is in the big picture -- one thing I'd like to throw in is the Heisenberg Principle, which is the effect of us on security in the world. And you suggested last week at the conference -- the Nuclear Policy Research Institute -- that, you know, our having weapons -- that we provoke -- other people want it, and in a way nonproliferation is kind of an oxymoron and that we can't expect that we can have them. And we can't go around insisting that everybody in the world -- it's untenable -- it's just psychologically impossible -- it's not political, this is psychological. And in the long run -- okay.

And people are more dangerous when they're afraid.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

We'll take two more questions.

Yes? Back there.

Q Hello, I'm Sharon Morrison (sp) representing the John Kerry campaign. President Bush's short list for preemptive strikes has seemed in recent months to include Syria. Do you think Mr. Kay's calling into question the intelligence accuracy for the attack on Iraq puts an end to the preemptive strike doctrine as it pertains to Syria?

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

(Inaudible.)

Q I'm Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers.

Wasn't and isn't the worst kind of weapon of mass destruction the deceived, devoted, determined, dedicated, suicide-bombing, murdering, destroying terrorists and the families who harbor and nurture and develop them? Wasn't the open defiance of Saddam Hussein, who proudly and effectively paid thousands of dollars to the families of these cultists, something that was brainwashing those who wanted to believe a lie? And weren't these publicized, broadcast acts of the butcher of Baghdad the past and present most dangerous weapon of mass destruction that has to be stopped and eliminated before more destruction and terror can take place?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Thank you.

MS. NOLAN: We'll take -- Stan Crock back there, one more question, please.

Q Thank you. There's a general impression that there were three intelligence failures: that the threat of Iraq was overstated, the threat of Iran and Libya were understated. Mr. Tenet's presentation this morning seemed to suggest that in fact the CIA was not surprised by what Libya and Iran had. I'd like to get the panel's impression of that.

MS. NOLAN: I think what we'll do now is give each of the panel members two minutes to respond to the range of questions asked. I'm sorry to have to close this off. We have an arrangement with the webcast and C-SPAN.

So, Joe, why don't you go first.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Thanks. Just at the last issue of the underestimation, this is a problem that we had in our intelligence assessment process. While we, for example, exaggerated the threat from Iraq, exaggerated the threat from ballistic missiles over the past five years, it seems obvious to most outside observers that we missed the extent of the nuclear programs in Iran and in Libya; that we were surprised by how far along these programs were. Director Tenet was saying no, we did know about this. I suppose that's something we will have to investigate. We will need a little more information from him.

But here's the good news about the underestimation. It turns out that there's ways to correct it, that it isn't necessary that we rely solely on U.S. intelligence collection means to judge these dangers. In the case of Iran, what we had was an internal dissident group coming up, providing us with information. We could then turn to the International Atomic Energy Agency to come in and do international inspections, inspections that are more acceptable to many countries than to have a U.S. inspection come in, and they gave us -- have given us tremendous details about the Iranian program.

And now, because of diplomacy, the Iranians themselves are giving us information about their supplier network. Similarly in Libya; it's diplomacy that has opened up that area. And Libya is now rolling over on its suppliers like a drug dealer caught on the street, and

giving us this kind of information.

So there's ways to supplement it. We should never think that we have to make these policy judgments based solely on our own national intelligence mechanisms. There's a world of other assets out there that we can tap into.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you, Joe.

If I could just -- two points on the question of the psychology of this. I think it's a tremendously understudied area, the phenomenology of "group think" or however you want to put it. And I think there's a great deal of complicity to go around in this regard; that the think tank community, experts, media, et cetera, have all contributed to this perception, that we had no basis to really challenge, that weapons of mass destruction were alive and well in Iraq. And I think that's a very important phenomenon that's prevalent in Washington that's worthwhile looking at.

I remember during the first Gulf War being on then the MacNeil- Lehrer Report and saying that there were 36 Scud launchers in Iraq. And that's what Schwarzkopf had said, and that's what my book research said. And Lehrer, I think, turned to the three panelists and said, "Where do you get your information?" And I almost said, "From each other." (Laughter.)

Quickly, on the point about Iran and Libya, I think there's a very, very important subtext that you've hit on there; the point being that we did have good intelligence, much better intelligence on those two countries, and that did not prompt or precipitate any serious form of engagement about the use of force but, rather, much more sophisticated approaches that are progressing even as we speak. And that there is -- I think they're two examples of a positive role of intelligence gathering, assessment and policy. I think that was the subtext. If not, apologies to George Tenet. But that's what I heard.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I just wanted to build on the point that Joe made about the necessity of drawing on multiple sources in order to form our judgments and our conclusions. I think that's very important. And I think now we need to also draw on multiple sources for our solution sets.

In particular, we spoke very briefly about the Proliferation Security Initiative early on.

That's come in for a lot of criticism for, perhaps, being somewhat outside the realm of international law. I think the administration, as far as I can understand, is now looking much more at the various mechanisms of international law as they relate to the PSI. And I think that's a good thing. But more importantly, the way the PSI draws on different law enforcement techniques, drug enforcement, environmental enforcement, to think about how we need now to tackle proliferation problems, I think we need to go well beyond our export control regimes, for example, and try to learn some lessons from other realms in the enforcement arena and make use of them and try to build on them now because I think there is much that can be learned, particularly from the international law enforcement arena, to tackle some of these difficult problems and shut down what has variously been called the Wal-Mart or today the Sam's Club of nuclear proliferation.

Thank you.

MS. NOLAN: (Off mike.)

MR. LITWAK: Thank you, Janne.

One final comment that will pull together a number of threads running through the questions. Let me just conclude by emphasizing the need for sound analysis of the target state as a prerequisite for strategy development. We need to understand what has been called the strategic personality of each of these states, how history, culture, factors that arise from the regional structure affect the state and those that are regime specific.

In the case of Iraq, there's no doubt that the megalomania of Saddam Hussein drove his weapons of mass destruction programs. In the post-Iraq period, we need to distinguish between those factors that were Saddam specific, so to speak, and other motivating factors that are not tied to the regime that may similarly motivate a successful regime if we don't take appropriate action.

In the cases of North Korea and Iran, the particular functional issue of concern to us, the nonproliferation issue, is embedded. It's embedded in the broader question of societal change. Where are the trajectories of these societies? And different concepts of change that are often implicit in recommendations of policy but which need to be clarified and scrutinized will lead to different recommendations with respect to strategy.

In the North Korean case, if you posit that regime collapse is imminent, that has a profound effect on the type of strategy you pursue. Likewise, if you're working from a different assumption and a different reading of the target state that come to the conclusion that the regime is able to insulate itself from the consequences of famine, et cetera, it could lead in a different direction. So that sound target state analysis is the prerequisite for strategy development.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you.

Bernard, you have the last word.

MR. FINEL: Let me just say two words about the issue of intelligence failure.

I'm very happy we raised the psychological issues that come up, because David Kay's presentation was almost a textbook case study of the things that Robert Jervis, for example, has written about in "Perception and Misperception in International Politics". Our book also provides, I think, another hint about trying to get at this issue of intelligence failure.

In Washington, we like to find scapegoats. If something went wrong, someone must have done something wrong. (Laughs.) But it's often more complicated than that. And I'd suspect that after we end up looking at what happened with pre-war intelligence in Iraq we'll find that there lots of little things: bureaucratic politics and how they functioned, but

more importantly, institutional issues about how decisions are made, how assessments are made. I'll give you an example of what happened in terms of ballistic missiles, where the NIEs changed from the mid-'90s to the late '90s after the Rumsfeld Commission report came out. And what happened there wasn't that they suddenly changed their minds about the intelligence, but they changed their analytic methodology from a standard which said, Is it PROBABLE that these states are developing missiles, to, Is it POSSIBLE for them to develop these missiles.

And again, I suspect it's the same kind of thing that we'll see in Iraq, especially post-9/11, when there was much less risk tolerance, where it's much more likely that analysts were saying themselves, We don't want to err on the side of underestimating the threat; it's better to err on the side of overestimating the threat. In the risk -- in a high risk environment, that's the normal thing to expect. And just some very subtle changes in the standards by which the intelligence was judged is I suspect we'll find contributed through a self-reinforcing cycle to more and more bad feedback on the intelligence.

So I'll leave it at that.

MS. NOLAN: Thank you very much, Bernard.

Thank you to all of you, and again to the Carnegie Endowment, to Joe and to Rose for hosting this, and to those of you who stayed past the celebrity buzz factor. (Laughter.) Thank you very much. (Applause.)

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